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The Weaponization of Syria’s Reconstruction: 





It is indeed instructive that discussions of reconstruction often 
fail to provide a definition, or at the very least a general expla-
nation, of what exactly they mean by the term. The assumption 
appears to be that the term is so readily understood to not require 
an explanation. Another common characteristic of such discus-
sions is a preoccupation with how international, regional and na-
tional players are attempting to advance, or undermine, 
reconstruction. The focus on how various parties are interacting 
with a process, however, should not be confused, as often is the 
case, with a focus on the actual process. While the former is con-
sumed with context, the latter attempts to shed light on agency. 
To focus on agency is to invariably focus on yet another con-
spicuously neglected subject, the actual communities that have 
been the victim of partial or wholescale destruction. Not only do 
discussions of Syria’s reconstruction generally remain loyal to 
these shortcomings, they additionally reflect a very determined 
attempt to weaponize the idea of reconstruction in various ways 
and towards various ends.  
The weaponization of Syria’s reconstruction started as early 
as 2012, and by 2016, with the end of the battle for Aleppo, it 
had accelerated rapidly, reaching full culmination with the pass-
ing of the ‘Strengthening America's Security in the Middle East 
Act’ (February 5. 2019). The focus here is on how this weapon-
ization was achieved conceptually, rather than operationally (i.e. 
social media dissemination). This form of weaponization may be 
termed ‘conceptual weaponization’ as it provides the ideas, facts 
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and statements that are subsequently used by social media activ-
ists to reinforce their messages. The aim is to shed light not only 
on how distant the idea of reconstruction ultimately is from the 
realities it was meant to be preoccupied with, but also on the ex-
tent to which reconstruction became a front for the political and 
economic empowerment of various factions and players. 
 
Conceptual Weaponization 
The weaponization of political discourse, though now associated 
with the internet and social media, is an ancient craft, and exam-
ples of how it was articulated can be identified long before the 
internet arrived. Granted, the subject is very broad and complex, 
but a preliminary sketch of a very specific branch of weaponiza-
tion is attempted here. Conceptual weaponization involves the 
creation of an understanding of a political term, an understand-
ing that is closed (i.e. it does not allow for multiple interpreta-
tions), entrapping (i.e. it is integrated with inbuilt incentives), 
and exclusionary (i.e. it is predicated on the creation of an en-
emy).1 The language used by ‘The Covenant of the League of 
Nations’ to describe the idea of the ‘Mandate’, including that of 
France over Syria, illustrates all three characteristics: 
 
 
                                                     
1 On the weaponization of language, see: Singer, P. W., & Brooking, E. T. 
(2018). Likewar: The weaponization of social media; Jeremiah Clabough, 
Mark Pearcy, (2018) "“Wild words” – analyzing angry rhetoric in American 
politics", Social Studies Research and Practice, Vol. 13 Issue: 3, pp.369-
382; Herrman, John. “If everything can be ‘weaponized,’ what should we 
fear?” The New York Times Magazine. March 14, 2017. https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/03/14/magazine/if-everything-can-be-weaponized-what-
should-we-fear.html; and Apter, Emily. “Weaponized Thought: Ethical Mil-
itance and the Group Subject.” Grey Room 14 (Winter 2004); Allenby, Brad 
and Joel Garreau, “Weaponized Narrative Is the New Battlespace,” Defense 
One [3 January 2017]. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/01/weapon-
ized-narrative-newbattlespace/134284/; Katerji, O. (2018, September 13). 
The Kremlin has weaponised doubt in Syria – and Labour is helping. Avail-
able at: https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2018/09/krem-
lin-has-weaponised-doubt-syria-and-labour-helping 
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Article 22: 
“To those colonies … which are inhabited by peoples not yet 
able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the 
modern world, there should be applied the principle that the 
well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust 
of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust 
should be embodied in this Covenant.” 
The idea of the mandate is conceptually closed in the sense that 
its nature and purpose are treated as though they were irrefutable 
facts. It is entrapping because it is promising unconditional au-
thority to the countries administering the mandate (i.e. Britain 
and France), and civilizational advancement to the populations 
they are being authorized to administer. And it is, finally, exclu-
sionary in the sense that it implies that those who don’t subscribe 
to this understanding are a priori hostile to the development and 
best interests of the populations it oversees and working against 
what the international community has decreed. 
 
Reconstruction as utopia 
The first major usage of the term reconstruction is found in the 
narrative of the American Civil War (1861-1865).2 Even then, 
the term carried just as many myths (deliberately crafted, and at 
times possibly well-intentioned) as it does today. The myth, in 
mid-nineteenth century America, was that a post-war union can 
be reconstructed or, that the north was genuinely interested in its 
reconstruction. The actual way within which the term was un-
derstood by the victors was that the South (not the union) had to 
be radically reconstructed. The 1867-1868 Reconstruction Acts 
organized the South into occupied military districts and condi-
tioned the restoration of the ex-Confederate states to the Union 
on the condition of ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment (which 
                                                     
2 On reconstruction in the context of the American Civil War, see, Kirsch, S 
& Flint, Colin. (2011). “Introduction: Reconstruction and the worlds that 
war makes.” in Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Ge-
ographies, Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 3-28. 
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gave ex-slaves full citizenship). The myth, however, was not 
only that the victors were uninterested in the reconstruction of 
what was, but on a far more important level, the myth was that 
the victors could in fact succeed, irrespective of their victory, in 
reconstructing the South on their terms. Even one century later, 
the Civil Rights movement encountered a South that was cultur-
ally very hostile to the type of reconstruction the North had ear-
lier envisioned. So, in this sense, the term reconstruction carries 
a double illusion; not only is the proclaimed objective not the 
real objective of those who are using it, but even the real objec-
tive is ultimately very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.  
From its earliest usage, the term ‘reconstruction’ implied 
restoration, or a return to a previous, often idealized, reality. At 
its most basic level, it implied the rebuilding of structures that 
were destroyed during war, and at a higher level of sophistica-
tion, it implied a rebuilding of not only physical structures, but 
of political, economic and social frameworks, which, in their to-
tality, constituted a specific moment in time that ‘reconstruction’ 
would restore.3 Because reconstruction is an activity, a method, 
                                                     
3 On the theory and applications of reconstruction, see, Abu Ismail, K., 
Imady, O., Kuncic, A., and Nujum, U., 2016. Syria At War: Five Years Later. 
ESCWA & St Andrews. Available at: 
https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publica-
tions/files/syria-war-five-years.pdf; Heydemann, Steven, "Beyond Fragility: 
Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States" (2018). Middle 
East Studies: Faculty Publications, Smith College, Northampton, MA. Avail-
able at: https://scholarworks.smith.edu/mes_facpubs/3; Arnold, Margaret; 
Elwan, Ann E.; Kreimer, Alcira I.; Muscat, Robert J.. 2000. Bosnia and Her-
zegovina - Post-conflict reconstruction (English). OED Evaluation country 
case study series; post-conflict reconstruction. Washington, DC: World Bank 
Group. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/cu-
rated/en/148931468201253246/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-Post-conflict-re-
construction; Barakat, S. 2005, After the conflict: reconstruction and 
development in the aftermath of war. I.B.Taurus; Cohen, Roberta. (2003). 
Reconstruction and Development Need Security To Be Effective (Afghani-
stan). [online] Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/arti-
cles/reconstruction-and-development-need-security-to-be-effective-
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and not an objective in itself, it cannot possibly be the destina-
tion. Hence, the focus shifts almost naturally from the process to 
the new reality it is seeking to actualize. When describing this 
new reality, the tendency is to speak in terms of a utopia that not 
only never existed, but which seems difficult to actualize under 
the best conditions and even in countries that have not undergone 
violence and destruction. Conceptual weaponization is achieved 
when features of these utopias become the standards upon which 
any planned reconstruction effort is judged. If it does not con-
form, it is labeled (politely) as an instrument of recreating the 
conditions that led to conflict, or (less diplomatically) as com-
plicit in war crimes against the Syrian people. 
The National Agenda for the Future of Syria (NAFS) pro-
vides one of the most elaborate explanations of this post-recon-
struction utopia. NAFS was launched by UN ESCWA in 2012 
with the aim of enaging “ ... Syrian experts and stakeholders in 
developing policy alternatives for Syria in preparation for a post-
agreement phase.”The Principles for a vision of ‘Syria 2030’ 
were reached through an extensive exercise lead by Syrians from 
across the political spectrum. In their totality, these principles 
encapsulate the utopia that the reconstruction of Syria will give 
birth to. They may be synthesized and paraphrased as follows: 
i. A political agreement that guarantees “a comprehensive 
transition” towards a Syria where “a culture of democ-
racy is built and practiced, mutual political trust is re-es-
tablished among the main political players, and the rule 
of law, equality and citizenship is established.”    
ii. The right of the displaced and the refugees to “a safe, 
dignified and voluntary return to their homes (or to any 
                                                     
afghanistan/; Jabareen, Yosef. (2013). Conceptualizing “Post-Conflict Re-
construction” and “Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction” of Failed States. 
[online] International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 26(2) pp. 
107-125. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10767-012-
9118-3;  
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other location inside the country they voluntarily choose 
to return to).”  
iii. A national reconciliation unto which all “Syrians are in-
vited and encouraged to contribute”. 
iv. A just and balanced development that directly contrib-
utes to stability, peace building and reconciliation at the 
local and the national levels that is tangibly manifested 
in the availability “of rehabilitated social and physical in-
frastructure” and; that “empowers people, especially the 
most vulnerable and poor, to attain their basic needs.” 
v. A governance framework that allows “the national ad-
ministrative structure to be comprehensive, participa-
tory, transparent, accountable, result-based, and achieve 
gender equality.” 
 
On the surface, these principles provide a vision of an inclu-
sive, democratic Syria that one would at least hope the vast ma-
jority of Syrians would concur with. On a more subtle level, 
however, these principles not only create false expectations in 
terms of what reconstruction can result in, but they also validate 
the assumption that ‘reconstruction’ is an actual legitimate pro-
cess that has a credible record, and that the only concern is 
whether or not it will be guided by an appropriate vision. The 
catastrophic failures of reconstruction in countries like Iraq and 
Afghanistan, for example, are clearly here irrelevant or at the 
very least are regarded as examples of what will not happen in 
Syria.  
The Syrian regime has its own vision of reconstruction, 
which is deliberately vague, but equally utopian. In various 
speeches and interviews, the Syrian president made scattered 
references to reconstruction.  
 
“… the more arduous challenge lies in rebuilding, socially and 
psychologically, those who have been affected by the crisis. It 
will not be easy to eliminate the social effects of the crisis, espe-
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cially extremist ideologies. Real reconstruction is about devel-
oping minds, ideologies and values. Infrastructure is valuable, 
but not as valuable as human beings; reconstruction is about per-
petuating both.” (Interview with the German Frankfurter Allge-




“The rebuilding of minds and the reform of people is the major 
challenge rather than the rebuilding of the infrastructure. When 
they started this war against us, they knew they would destroy 
the infrastructure, and they knew that we would rebuild it, but 
what is much harder is how to interact with the intellectual struc-
tures and we must not fail in confronting this challenge.” (Asad’s 
speech, 18 February, 2019 – my translation) 
 
Asad’s emphasis on the rebuilding of human capital under-
scores the regime’s concern with the fact that even if Syria is 
physically rebuilt, this will have no impact on the extent to which 
millions of Syrians will reman fierce enemies of everything the 
regime stands for. Hence the emphasis on rebuilding the intel-
lectual foundations of Syrian society implies a type of recon-
struction akin, in sensibility (though clearly not in nature), to 
what the North had in mind after the American civil war. The 
South had to be culturally restructured, and in Asad’s mind, 
Syria, Syrians opposed to the regime in particular, require intel-
lectual restructuring.   
A far more elaborate utopia was identified by the particpants 
in Sochi (Janurary 2018). Here reconstruction is seen as the 
grand summation of what all Syrians (represented at Sochi) 
aspire to. Twelve major principles that sound more like the 
manifesto of a political party are articulated: 
1. Sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and unity of 
the Syrian Arab Republic. 
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2. Syria’s national sovereign equality and rights regarding non-
intervention. 
3. Syrian people shall determine the future of their country by 
the ballot box. 
4. Syrian Arab Republic shall be a democratic and non-sec-
tarian state. 
5. Syria to be committed to national unity, social peace. 
6. Continuity and improved performance of state and public in-
stitutions. 
7. A strong national army that carries out its duties in accord-
ance with the constitution. 
8. Commitment to combat - terrorism, fanaticism, extremism 
and sectarianism. 
9. Respect and protection of human rights and public freedoms. 
10. Value placed on Syria’s society and national identity, and its 
history of diversity. 
11. Fighting poverty and providing support for the elderly and 
other vulnerable groups. 
12. Preservation and protection of national heritage and the natu-
ral environment. 
We even have negative utopias, that is utopias that identify 
what reconstruction should not involve but are ironically just as 
utopian in what they assume can be achieved in lieu of the model 
they are concerned with negating. In Beyond fragility: Syria and 
the challenges of reconstruction in fierce states, Steven Hey-
demann writes: 
 
“Thus, the aim of post-conflict reconstruction is not to return 
war-torn societies and states to their pre-war condition, but to 
make use of the space that violent conflict is presumed to create 
to put in place institutions, norms, and practices that address the 
causes of violence and provide a basis for effective governance 
and sustainable peace.” 
What all these utopias have in common is the closed nature 
of their logic. It is closed because there is a circular link between 
their assumptions and conclusions. They do not, for example, 
question whether or not their vision can be achieved, how it will 
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be achieved, or if it has been achieved elsewhere. Their premise 
is that it is required, for various reasons, and hence it should be 
pursued. More importantly, they all come with direct and indi-
rect warnings that caution us from the dangers of not adhering to 
their prescriptions, from the recreation of the climate conducive 
to conflict, to the strengthening of the regime and its allies. 
 
Reconstruction as an Opportunity 
As early as February 2012, the idea of ‘preparing’ for the recon-
struction of Syria starts to gain currency. The only challenge was 
how to make this idea more attractive. The message purports to 
be an invitation for the international community to be prepared 
to assist Syria once the war is over. In actuality, the message 
involves articulating an opportunity, a multi-layered opportunity 
that has something in it for everyone. It is first an opportunity 
for Syrians opposed to the regime to cast themselves as trusted 
experts who are in a better position to provide such expertise 
than their international counterparts. In August 2012, a group of 
Syrian intellectuals created a think tank, The Day After; Support-
ing a Democratic Transition in Syria or TDA. TDA aimed at 
providing “a detailed framework of principles, goals and recom-
mendations … for addressing challenges in six key fields: rule 
of law; transitional justice; security sector reform; constitutional 
design; electoral system design; and post-conflict social and eco-
nomic reconstruction [emphasis mine].” With time, the dimen-
sions of the opportunity become clearer to the organized 
opposition, and by November 2012, the term begins to be in-
voked with more assertiveness: “The incoming or transitional 
government in Damascus will confront not just the physical and 
social destruction of the war effort, as well as its collateral ef-
fects on regional stability, but also the deep legacies of a 40-year 
dictatorship. Its urgent domestic tasks will include … recon-
structing infrastructure and the state apparatus …” The ‘oppor-
tunity’ here is for the opposition to prove itself credible and 
worthy of becoming the new leadership of Syria. The myth, no 
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doubt, is the idea that members of the opposition have any expe-
rience in building, or rebuilding, anything akin to what they as-
pire to undertake. Once again, the ‘double illusions’ apply both 
the professed message and the actual message are equally de-
tached from reality. 
Reconstruction is foremost, however, an opportunity for the 
Syrian regime to signal the end of the conflict and for the initia-
tion of its international rehabilitation. Yet, without a price tag 
placed on it, the opportunity remains not adequately attractive, 
nor weaponized. The price tag required is a financial one. Other 
types, like the survey conducted by UNRWA in mid-2013 which 
estimated that it would take around 30 years for Syria’s economy 
to recover, are not helpful and will be duly ignored by players 
across the board. In June 2013, we are informed that a six mem-
ber UN team lead by Abdallah Dardari, Syria’s ex-Deputy Prime 
Minister for Economic Affairs, has arrived at the first estimate 
of what it would cost to reconstruct Syria: $60 billion. The figure 
is first repeated, then is systematically increased “… the country 
would need at least $80 billion to put the economy back to what 
it was prior to the uprising …”; “Syria’s interim minister: $100 
billion needed for reconstruction”; “Rebuilding damaged physi-
cal infrastructure will be a monumental task, with reconstruction 
cost estimates in the range of $100 to $200 billion”; and the final 
number is left to be identified by the president himself: “Syrian 
President Bashar Assad estimated Thursday that it may take up 
to $400 billion to reconstruct Syria after the conflict …” 
On the surface, these numbers are attempts to capture dam-
age and, in turn, the costs of rebuilding. The sources responsible 
for their initial computation (e.g. ESCWA, the National Agenda 
for Syria, etc.) are generally technical bodies, well intended and 
as objective as it is possible when it comes to a subject as in-
flamed as Syria. The point here isn’t to cast doubt on why such 
numbers were calculated, but rather on how these numbers are 
subsequently weaponized to achieve very different objectives. 
As those who have actually gone through the economic exercise 
of calculating them would assert, these numbers tell us nothing 
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about how they will be, or can be, used to finance the rebuilding 
of anything. At best they measure the value of what was de-
stroyed. The logical fallacy of the idea of reconstruction is that 
you can in fact rebuild if only you had the resources required. 
This assumption was dramatically disproven in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and, according to at least some economists, it didn’t even 
apply during the implementation of the Marshal Plan. Recon-
struction efforts in post-WWII Europe were never fully depend-
ent on US assistance, and more often than not, were primarily 
based on local resources. The primary success stories took place 
where there was something already on the ground, a thirsty po-
tential already attempting on its own to reconstruct, and then, 
subsequently, benefitting from a financial contribution that it 
was ready to do without. The US spent around $13 billion dollars 
to reconstruct Europe, (now equivalent to approximately $100 
billion); already less than what the US has so far spent on the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan. Indeed, corruption depleted the 
vast majority of these resources, and much of the same applies 
on the reconstruction of Iraq. In fact, it would not be difficult to 
show how the higher the number allocated for reconstruction, 
the more likely it will be misused. The point here, however, is 
that all of this is well understood and purposely employed by the 
various political camps fighting over Syria. The premise appears 
to be is that the higher the price tag, the more attractive the invi-
tation is (i.e. a country that requires $400 billion to reconstruct 
is far more attractive than a country that requires $100 billion). 
Indeed, some of the headings almost read like an investment op-
portunity: “A Los Angeles banker, the head of a Middle Eastern 
investment bank and retired General Wesley Clark plan to an-
nounce Monday the formation of an investment fund to help re-
build Syria.” Not only is it an investment opportunity, it is one 
which many are deemed ‘unworthy’ of: “Talking about the re-
construction of Syria’s war-torn regions, President Assad said 
companies from different countries have already offered their 
services in rebuilding Syria. While French and Swiss firms are 
among those ready to participate, the Syrian government will do 
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its best to give Russian companies the best contracts …” After 
all, the price of being part of such a lucrative opportunity is to 
have supported the Syrian regime, or, at the very least, to be will-
ing to suspend all the rhetoric and activities that question its le-
gitimacy. 
 
Reconstruction as punishment  
In more practical terms, reconstruction can also be weaponized 
to exclude, or include, legitimise or demonize.4 The Syrian re-
gime understood this well and proceeded to enact laws to rede-
fine demographically and economically post-war Syria into what 
Asad described as “a healthier and more homogeneous society.” 
Though as noted above, these top down approaches to social re-
alities consistently fail, the suffering and dispossession they can 
result in is very real. Take for example the town of Darayya, lo-
cated 8 km south-west of the centre of Damascus, and belonging 
administratively, to the Rural Damascus governorate. In August 
2016, the town fell to regime forces, and the remaining popula-
tion were resettled in Idlib (7700), and Herjaleh (600).  It is un-
clear what happened to the original 78,000 (at the very least) 
inhabitants of Darayya. It seems likely that long before August 
2016, thousands left the town to either other parts of Syria, or 
left Syria altogether. What concerns us is that Darayya today is 
largely vacant of its original indigenous inhabitants and, hence, 
to speak of a reconstruction program in Darayya would be to 
normalize a demographic distortion. Yet, in early 2017, a com-
mittee for the reconstruction of Darayya was formed under the 
Prime Minister’s Office. Much of the same would apply on nu-
merous other towns in Syria, stretching from Ifrin, in the north-
west, to Daraa, in the southeast.  
Reconstruction that is based on demographic distortions is 
similar to reconstruction that is based on physical distortions. 
While the former targets people who moved into an area after its 
                                                     
4 See for example, Wintermute, Bobby A.; Ulbrich, David J.: Race and Gen-
der in Modern Western Warfare. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg 2019, p. 
338. 
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original inhabitants have been displaced, the latter redefines an 
area entirely. Southwest of Damascus, and not too far from Dar-
rayya, is an area known as Basateen el-Razi. Prior to 2011, the 
area was home to thousands of people who were too poor to af-
ford regular houses, and who therefore built their shacks and 
ramshackle houses in the fields behind the houses of the Mezzeh 
highway. Today, a ‘reconstruction’ program has been initiated 
that aims at replacing these houses with skyscrapers and shop-
ping centres. It would be entirely different if the indigenous in-
habitants of Basateen el-Razi were the actual beneficiaries of 
such a program. As it stands, the program recreates a new phys-
ical reality and ignores the future prospects of returnees which, 
as studies have confirmed, in the vast majority of cases return to 
their own homes (even if such homes were partially damaged).  
     In the same vain, several decrees, from Law number 66 
(2012) to Law number 10 (2018), have created a situation where 
the indigenous inhabitants of an area will find it even harder to 
return to their towns and villages and repossess their homes, and 
land. The idea that a refugee or a displaced person must some-
how provide proof of ownership of a house that is most probably 
damaged or destroyed, and which was most probably built with-
out legal documentation, amounts to (at the very least) a strong 
disinvitation to return. Since Syrian refugees and the displaced 
already face numerous other obstacles that make their return dif-
ficult, these decrees make the hard even harder, and legitimize 
their inability to return.  
On the other side of the spectrum, reconstruction as an in-
strument of punishment was also employed by the West, the US 
in particular. The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act was first 
initiated in July 2016, and on the 15th of November 2016, it unan-
imously passed the House as The Caesar Syria Civilian Protec-
tion Act (HR 5732). After dying in previous congresses, another 
version, H.R. 1677 (115th), passed the House on May 17, 2017. 
It was considered by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
on September 26, 2018, and on the 3rd of October 2018, an up-
dated text of the bill was published. On the 19th of January 2019, 
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it passed the House, yet again, as the ‘Strengthening America's 
Security in the Middle East Act of 2019’. Finally, on the 5th of 
February 2019, it was passed by the Senate. The language of the 
Act that pertains to Syria is consistent with the objectives of pun-
ishment and exclusion: 
 
• Requires the President to impose sanctions on 
foreign individuals if the President determines that 
the foreign individual knowingly engages in any of 
the following activities (Title III, Subtitle A, Sec. 
312): 
• Knowingly provides significant financial, material, 
or technological support to, or knowingly engages 
in a significant transaction with the Government of 
Syria; 
• Knowingly sells or provides significant goods, 
services, technology, information, or other support 
that significantly facilitates the maintenance or 
expansion of the Government of Syria’s domestic 
production of natural gas, petroleum, or petroleum 
products; 
• Knowingly, directly or indirectly, provides 
significant construction or engineering services to 
the Government of Syria. 
The Strengthening America's Security in the Middle East Act is 
very clear on what should not take place, but it is not concerned 
with what should take place. Clarity on what should not happen 
and ambiguity on what should, has been a common feature of 
American foreign policy in Syria, and it is reminiscent of how 
the US interacted with the use of chemical weapons. The Syrian re-
gime should not use chemical weapons, US officials strongly 
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proclaimed, but its use of other forms of killing (e.g. barrel 
bombs) is ignored. In the same vain, countries should not support 
the reconstruction of Syria, but how the suffering of the refugees 
and the displaced will be alleviated is not an American security 
interest nor is it relevant to an Act that, by its very name, is con-




When the history of the Syrian Uprising is finally written, one of 
the important aspects of this history will be the way in which 
certain ideas were weaponized by various actors. Such a history 
may begin with the regime’s mu’amirah or conspiracy theory 
that portrayed the protestors as agents of a foreign plot who prac-
ticed jihad alnikah or sexual jihad, move on to the opposition’s 
use of sa’it al sifr or zero hour to dramatize the immanent end of 
the regime, and would include how the West used an incremental 
(verbal) delegitimization of the regime (‘from Asad should step 
down’ to ‘Asad must go’) creating in the process the illusion that 
such delegitimization techniques are capable of impacting the 
regime’s survival. The latest, though unlikely to be the last, is 
the idea of reconstruction, an idea that carries with it the illusory 
promise of a phase beyond war where Syria’s rebirth would take 
place. What is perhaps distinct about reconstruction is the extent 
to which it was about the regime’s legitimacy, as opposed to its 
continuity. Past examples of weaponization were significantly 
instruments of actual war, when at stake was the very survival of 
the regime. Reconstruction, on the other hand, belongs to a battle 
over the regime’s international rehabilitation.  
The significance of The Strengthening America's Security 
in the Middle East Act lies in the blow it delivered to the regime’s 
attempt to restore its legitimacy through reconstruction. As 
noted above, the Act was first contemplated in mid-2016, and it 
took until February 2019 for it to be passed by the Senate. In 
only three months, (February-May 2019), the reconstruction of 
Syria has already started losing the coverage and momentum it 
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enjoyed until early 2019. The Syrian regime’s success in the 
weaponization of ideas during the war phase of Syria’s uprising 
may explain some of the peculiar aspects of the president’s latest 
speech, delivered only days after the passing of The Strengthen-
ing America's Security in the Middle East Act. Rather than em-
phasize victory and moving beyond the war, as he had done in 
earlier speeches, Asad actually proclaimed that Syria was still at 
war, in fact it was now fighting four distinct wars. Perhaps the 
regime is sensing that it was far easier to weaponize the war than 
it is to weaponize the peace. 
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